[tbb-bugs] #18361 [Tor Browser]: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
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Mon Feb 22 13:59:44 UTC 2016
#18361: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
Reporter: ioerror | Owner: tbb-team
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: High | Milestone:
Component: Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Critical | Resolution:
Keywords: security, privacy, anonymity | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Comment (by ioerror):
Replying to [comment:37 jgrahamc]:
> Replying to [comment:35 ioerror]:
> > This is useful though it is unclear - is this what CF uses on the
backend? Is this data the reason that Google's captchas are so hard to
> It's a data source that we use for IP reputation. I was using it as
illustrative as well because it's a third party. I don't know if there's
any connection between Project Honeypot and Google's CAPTCHAs.
How do we vet this information or these so-called "threat scores" other
than trusting what someone says?
> > Offering a read only version of these websites that prompts for a
captcha on POST would be a very basic and simple way to reduce the flood
of upset users. Ensuring that a captcha is solved and not stuck in a 14 or
15 solution loop is another issue - that may be a bug unsolvable by CF but
rather needs to be addressed by Google. Another option, as I mentioned
above, might be to stop a user before ever reaching a website that is
large end points (CF and Google).
> I'm not convinced about the R/O solution. Seems to me that Tor users
would likely be more upset the moment they got stale information or
couldn't POST to a forum or similar. I'd much rather solve the abuse
problem and make this go away completely.
Are you convinced that it is strictly worse than the current situation?
I'm convinced that it is strictly better to only toss up a captcha that
loads a Google research when a user is about to interact with the website
in a major way.
I do not believe that you can solve abuse on the internet anymore than a
country "solve" healthcare or that the hacker community can "solve"
surveillance. Abuse is relative and it is part of having free speech on
the internet. There is no doubt a problem - but the solution is not to
collectively punish millions of people (and their bots who are people too,
man :-) ) based on ~1600 ip address "threat" scores.
> Also, the CAPTCHA-loop thing is an issue that needs to be addressed by
us and Google.
Does that mean that Google, in addition to CF, has data on everyone
hitting those captchas?
> I still think the blinded tokens thing is going to be interesting to
investigate because it would help anonymously prove that the User-Agent
was controlled by a human and could be sent eliminating the need for any
I'm not at all convinced that this can be done in the short term and it
seems to assume that users only use graphical browsers. Attackers will be
able to extract tokens and have farms of people solving things, when they
need new tokens, so usually regular users pay the highest price.
> > Does Google any end user connections for those captcha requests?
> Can you rewrite that? Couldn't parse it.
When a user is given a CF captcha - does Google see any request from them
directly? Do they see the Tor Exit IP hitting them? Is it just CF or is it
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18361#comment:41>
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