[tbb-bugs] #18361 [Tor Browser]: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
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Wed Apr 6 14:59:18 UTC 2016
#18361: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
Reporter: ioerror | Owner: tbb-team
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: High | Milestone:
Component: Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Critical | Resolution:
Keywords: security, privacy, anonymity | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor: None
Comment (by tne):
Replying to [comment:221 jgrahamc]:
> Replying to [comment:220 tne]:
> > I agree wholeheartedly with your mention of focusing on individual
requests instead (who wouldn't?). The problem is, it's just a promise at
this point. If you could really do it efficiently and reliably, this
entire discussion would be moot -- you could drop IP rep altogether.
However, you don't, so evidently you can't (yet) do it efficiently and
reliably, and timing matters.
> We already do examine individual requests to look for abuse. That's part
of the layers of defense we give web sites.
Exactly; it's "part of" your solution. In and of itself, it isn't
sufficient. This means you'll continue to rely on IP rep. Nobody likes
that, not even you I reckon, but it's the best you have right now. Dealing
with that reality, I think there are ways to reduce the pain in specific
areas (e.g. sites that are not being "actively abused") and that are worth
exploring. Would you comment on that?
> > Whatever long-term plans CF might have regarding a strictly request-
level approach, any short-term compromises will help.
> I'm working short and medium on this not long. Short term we've
introduced the ability for sites to whitelist Tor, we changed our
clearance cookie so that it applies across circuit changes, and we've
recently made changes to the CAPTCHAs which should stop people getting
stuck in loops of CAPTCHAs. I'm also working on a slightly less short term
project to apply other technologies (non-CAPTCHA) to Tor. The important
thing there is that I need to measure their effectiveness in this
situation and will do so.
I know, I've been following the discussion. I probably should have thanked
you and your team for that beforehand. As I said, I even benefit from some
of those changes, and that's great.
I'm looking forward to those non-CAPTCHA approaches. It's good to hear
they're planned for the "short to medium term", since for many people
those are the ones that matter most.
(Note that this is orthogonal to the point I was making; but that's OK.)
> > Attempting to reduce CF's reliance on it is a noble goal that I
support, I'm just afraid it is a mirage that will only perpetuate the
status quo (which, in my view and that of many others, is hardly tenable).
Hopefully I don't come across as a defeatist, I'm just trying to be
realistic (hence the more nuanced suggestion).
> I'm not spending my time here as some sort of mirage or PR exercise.
Given the whole thread above I understand the tone, but I'd like not to be
caught in the crossfire. I'm referring to a technical mirage (I think it's
fair to say at this point that dropping IP reputation is not a goal you
can set a date for right now, and maybe you'll never be able to). I have
yet to see anything that would suggest CF is trying to mislead anyone
deliberately, and I'm not trying to imply it myself.
Assumption: By "''It's better to think at an individual request level and
ask "Does this request indicate abuse?" and then decide what to do. Of
course, we can take into account other things as well, but [...]''" you
didn't really mean that you were aiming to do that exclusively, as that
would prevent you from using an IP reputation system (which uses data
besides the isolated request, i.e. reputation scores gathered via other
customer sites). I interpreted it like that however, and we might have
talked past each other. If that's correct, what I said will make more
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/18361#comment:222>
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