[tbb-bugs] #3059 [Tor Browser]: Find some way to deal with time-based fingerprints

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Thu Jan 29 03:06:29 UTC 2015

#3059: Find some way to deal with time-based fingerprints
     Reporter:           |      Owner:  tbb-team
  mikeperry              |     Status:  closed
         Type:  defect   |  Milestone:  TorBrowserBundle 2.3.x-stable
     Priority:  major    |    Version:
    Component:  Tor      |   Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-firefox-
  Browser                |  patch, TorBrowserTeam201501
   Resolution:  fixed    |  Parent ID:
Actual Points:           |
       Points:           |
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-firefox-patch => tbb-fingerprinting,
     tbb-firefox-patch, TorBrowserTeam201501
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


 Ok, so I think we finally have some semblance of direction here. We
 basically have two classes of time-based fingerprints:
 1. Fingerprints that are due to high resolution timing information (such
 as keystroke fingerprinting, performance fingerprinting, and various side
 channel attacks). These tickets are now tagged with tbb-fingerprinting-
 time-highres. https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?keywords
 1. Fingerprints that are due to the skew/delta between your local client
 clock and the webserver's notion of time. These tickets are now tagged
 with tbb-fingerprinting-time-skew.

 We are going to address both classes of issues with direct browser
 patches, though the latter class requires a reliable, authenticated
 timesource that is not capable of attacking users by manipulating their
 time in a targeted way. This may prove tricky.

Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3059#comment:13>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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