[ooni-dev] Fwd: Dimming the Internet: Detecting Throttling as a Mechanism of Censorship in Iran

isis agora lovecruft isis at torproject.org
Fri Jun 21 08:25:50 UTC 2013

----- Forwarded message from Collin Anderson <collina at gmail.com> -----

> From: Collin Anderson <collina at gmail.com>
> Subject: Dimming the Internet: Detecting Throttling as a Mechanism of Censorship in Iran
> Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2013 17:48:05 +0100
> Message-ID: <CA+CWxj+Xc-xa_Tr3sM4MEqtMR4Rv-rjv5hNPetG4wEG==DQEZA at mail.gmail.com>
> To: Collin Anderson <collina at gmail.com>
> *I hate to do the mass BCC thing, but wanted to brag to you specifically
> and hopefully get your attention for a **bit. I promise June and July will
> be an interesting month of research, so please forgive my vanity. - Collin*
> Today, my latest paper “Dimming the Internet: Detecting Throttling as a
> Mechanism of Censorship in Iran,” a documentation on three years of the use
> of bandwidth throttling as a means of political censorship in Iran, was
> posted on the publishing site arXiv.
> Blogpost (with Election data):
> http://cgcsblog.asc.upenn.edu/2013/06/20/dimming-the-internet-detecting-throttling-as-a-mechanism-of-censorship-in-iran-2/
> Paper (arXiv): http://arxiv.org/abs/1306.4361
> “Dimming the Internet" uses a three-year dataset of network measurements as
> a monitoring service for political throttling, then applies the methodology
> to shed light on the recent history of censorship in Iran, and finds that
> Iran’s Internet has experienced prolonged and significant disruptions timed
> annually near the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution and 25 Bahman, the
> first anniversary of the contested elections, and protests over the
> depreciation of the value of the Iranian Rial. Through the Measurement Lab
> (M-Lab) platform, anti-censorship researchers gain a diverse and
> non-partisan perspective on a network that is often opaque and difficult to
> access from outside. The results described not only shed light on instances
> of censorship, but also the manner in which public networks are subjected
> to a greater degree of disruption than those of business, universities and
> governments.
> Iran is not alone in this behavior, with Syria, Bahrain, Myanmar and
> Vietnam reportedly utilizing similar tactics. As stories of connection
> throttling timed with political instability grow and access to
> international communications platforms remains a necessary means for
> expression otherwise denied, “Dimming the Internet” provides a framework
> for accountability on a trend that thus far has been opaque. In the coming
> months, the Center for Global Communication Research at the Annenberg
> School for Communication will expand on this methodology as a means to
> account for historical cases and monitor this phenomenon on an ongoing
> basis globally.
> *“Dimming the Internet” was supported by the Center for Global
> Communication Studies at the University of Pennsylvania and Google
> Research. They are awesome.*
> -- 
> *Collin David Anderson*
> averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C.

----- End forwarded message -----

 ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
GPG: 4096R/A3ADB67A2CDB8B35
Current Keys: https://blog.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt

More information about the ooni-dev mailing list