[TWN team] Recent changes to the wiki pages

[Lunar]

===========================================================================
=== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2013/11 ===
===========================================================================

version 16
Author: harmony
Date:   2013-09-11T22:16:51+00:00

   picked this week's adjective

--- version 15
+++ version 16
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 ========================================================================
 
 Welcome to the twelfth issue of Tor Weekly News, the weekly newsletter that
-covers what is happening in the XXX Tor community.
+covers what is happening in the closely-observed Tor community.
 
 New Release of XXX
 ------------------

version 15
Author: harmony
Date:   2013-09-11T22:11:01+00:00

   added netbsd item (hope I have the right bsd version)

--- version 14
+++ version 15
@@ -92,6 +92,9 @@
 release of ports updated to the new tor 0.2.4.17-rc, while noting that
 versions for NetBSD and DragonFly BSD were not apparently available [XXX].
 
+In response to that BSD announcement, Christian Sturm promised the imminent
+arrival of an updated port for NetBSD [XXX].
+
 Karsten Loesing updated tor's GeoIP database to the newest version [XXX].
 
 The commitment level for the proposed Tor StackExchange page is hovering
@@ -101,6 +104,7 @@
  [XXX] http://lists.nycbug.org/pipermail/tor-bsd/2013-September/000044.html
  [XXX] https://trac.torproject.org/9714
  [XXX] http://area51.stackexchange.com/proposals/56447/tor-online-anonymity-privacy-and-security
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013-September/030034.html
 
 Vulnerabilities
 ---------------

version 14
Author: harmony
Date:   2013-09-11T21:58:45+00:00

   drafted the geoip, bsd and stackexchange items into the miscellaneous
   section

--- version 13
+++ version 14
@@ -88,15 +88,19 @@
 Miscellaneous news
 ------------------
 
-Item 1 with cited source [XXX].
+Brian Callahan alerted relay operators running FreeBSD and OpenBSD to the
+release of ports updated to the new tor 0.2.4.17-rc, while noting that
+versions for NetBSD and DragonFly BSD were not apparently available [XXX].
 
-Item 2 with cited source [XXX].
+Karsten Loesing updated tor's GeoIP database to the newest version [XXX].
 
-Item 3 with cited source [XXX].
+The commitment level for the proposed Tor StackExchange page is hovering
+at 73%; it needs to reach 100% before it will be accepted. If you think
+you will be able to contribute, please sign up! [XXX]
 
- [XXX]
- [XXX]
- [XXX]
+ [XXX] http://lists.nycbug.org/pipermail/tor-bsd/2013-September/000044.html
+ [XXX] https://trac.torproject.org/9714
+ [XXX] http://area51.stackexchange.com/proposals/56447/tor-online-anonymity-privacy-and-security
 
 Vulnerabilities
 ---------------

version 13
Author: harmony
Date:   2013-09-11T21:42:27+00:00

   draft of entry guards/linkability item

--- version 12
+++ version 13
@@ -53,6 +53,38 @@
  [XXX] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-nsa-gchq-and-quick-ant-speculation
  [XXX] https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#AttacksOnOnionRouting
 
+Entry guards and linkability
+----------------------------
+
+Leif Ryge pointed out [XXX] an issue with Tor's current 'entry guards'
+system, whereby connections entering Tor from different points on the
+same network could potentially be linked to an individual user based on
+the three entry nodes selected by that user's Tor client, which remain
+constant for a period of 4-8 weeks [XXX].
+
+Leif suggested that "assuming this is an accurate assessment, wouldn't
+it make sense to maintain separate sets of entry guards for each network
+that the user connects from?"
+
+Nick Mathewson replied [XXX] with an acknowledgement of the problem and
+a number of reasons why simply generating separate sets of guards might
+also harm a user's anonymity: "You would *not*, for example, want to
+maintain a different set of entry guards for every IP that you receive,
+since if you did, a hostile DHCP server could feed you new IPs until you
+picked a hostile guard. Similarly, if you are a busy traveller who changes
+your view of what network you are on hundreds or thousands of times, your
+chance of picking a hostile guard would rise accordingly." He also pointed
+out that "having a record in your state file of every network you have
+visited is not necessarily the best idea either."
+
+Nick concluded by mentioning Roger Dingledine's proposal to lower the
+number of entry guards selected by a client to one only, "to avoid the
+property of letting guard choices identify Tor clients".
+
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005423.html
+ [XXX] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of-a-new-relay
+ [XXX] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-September/005424.html
+
 Miscellaneous news
 ------------------
 



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