[network-health] Changes on the Tor Network - #31549

[teor]

Hi,

I did a quick review and a copyedit for sentence length and confusing
phrasing.

T

--
teor
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> On 3 Oct 2019, at 05:50, David Goulet <dgoulet at torproject.org> wrote:
> 
> Signed PGP part
> On 30 Sep (16:31:21), David Goulet wrote:
>> On 30 Sep (14:56:26), gus wrote:
>>> On Wed, Sep 11, 2019 at 09:26:26AM +1000, teor wrote:
>>>> Hi,
>>>> 
>>>>> On 11 Sep 2019, at 01:14, David Goulet <dgoulet at torproject.org> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> There are things in there that might be _very_ dicy or even controversial for
>>>>> some in TPO. Especially around the "fadding out LTS support for relays".
>>>>> 
>>>>> My approach here was to list some things for which having an LTS policy and
>>>>> EOL relays in the network is actually hurting us. And then the conclusion of
>>>>> removing EOL relays + new upcoming relay policy.
>>>> 
>>>> Should we get Nick to check this?
>>>> He wants a strong commitment to our current LTS schedule.
>>>> 
>>>> T
>>> 
>>> Hi,
>>> 
>>> I made a small update to point relay operators to Debian repository
>>> instructions: https://support.torproject.org/apt
>>> 
>>> I read the blog post and the only suggestion that I have is to change
>>> the order of the paragraphs. The information about what's going to
>>> happen and how to take action should be in the first paragraphs. I don't
>>> want users in panic, but if people will read one paragraph before
>>> jumping to other website, which information they must be aware of?
>>> 
>>> Thanks for the blog post! It's pretty good! :)
>> 
>> Thanks Gus!!!
>> 
>> So heads up everyone: I've just came back today from vacation so I haven't had
>> time to revisit the post.
> 
> There it is: https://pad.riseup.net/p/rZ2AWu66KJKJw1gAxkrw-keep
> 
> I'm asking you all for a _very_ quick review of this. Please directly do any
> corrections onto the pad.
> 
> The timeline for this as speed up quite a bit due to the now rejection
> strategy as stated in the post. This is mainly motivated now because of a
> possible large scale attacker that was found on the network some days ago for
> which the relays are all in the EOL relay set. (Two stones at once).
> 
> I'm still unsure of the timeline that is the *when* we'll push the reject
> rules to the dirauth since I'm still discussing things with them on the
> dirauth list.
> 
> But I expect in the coming days starting tomorrow.
> 
> The network team security list has been informed of this with more details.
> Most of active bad relay team people as well. And finally the dirauth
> community. Steph is also in the loop for this post. I will inform Isabela
> after I send this email as well.
> 
> (Syncing everyone is not easy!)
> 
> And IMO we _have_ to release this post roughly at the same time as we are
> rolling out the reject rules to the dirauth so we don't give a chance of the
> attacker to upgrade to a stable release too quickly.
> 
> Thanks everyone!
> David
> 
> --
> t9JRb9sByD7tnqJuvCEeVZHLk5euodS338Tfz3li0Jc=
> 
> 

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