[anti-censorship-team] Snowflake rendezvous design meeting 2021-05-18 14:00
David Fifield
david at bamsoftware.com
Tue May 18 17:03:40 UTC 2021
Summary of the discussion today:
- The JSON formats from https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/merge_requests/36
look suitable, but the 400 responses should also be somehow
encapsulated as errors inside the message body. Internal refactoring
of the broker is not necessary at this point, as long as we're
reasonably sure the message formats will work for other rendezvous
methods.
- We talked about where to put message version numbers. cohosh likes the
idea of having the version number at the start of the message, outside
the JSON container. We talked about an algorithm like this:
- Read up to 64 bytes or the first newline.
- If the first byte is '{', then this is a legacy-format message.
- If there is no newline in the first 64 bytes, then error.
- Interpret everything up to the first newline as a version number.
- If the version number is not understood, then error.
- Read the remainder of the body (up to some sane limit)
- Parse the remainder according to the version number.
- Should there be a version number on the broker's response messages
too? Or can the client assume that the broker returns a response in a
format appropriate for whatever the client's registration message was?
We can make that assumption now, because we tightly control the
broker, but if there were more broker or ones that we don't directly
control, it might be harder to guarantee that. I don't remember what
we decided on this point.
- We brainstormed ideas for splitting the broker into components
(#26092). Because this is a matter internal to the broker that does
not affect protocol messages, we don't have to decide it now. We
discussed placing the broker behind a TLS terminator like Apache, with
the broker being a separate localhost web server, as is done with the
ProxyPass setup for BridgeDB. Separate TLS termination would help with
a future AMP cache rendezvous, which needs to somehow share TCP port
443 with the broker's HTTPS rendezvous. The most expedient way to do
this would be to add /amp routes to the broker's existing HTTP
handlers. An intermediate way would be to have the broker act like a
TLS terminator for /amp routes, and proxy those requests to a separate
localhost HTTP server that handles AMP cache rendezvous. cohosh and
meskio may proceed with starting to break the broker into components
if they have a good vision of how to do it.
- Regardless of how the broker is factored, where should message parsing
(and in the future, decryption/encryption) happen? Should the
rendezvous receivers pass their messages to the broker matching module
verbatim, without interpretation? Or should they parse the incoming
messages into a uniform in-memory data structure, and pass that to the
broker matching module? With encrypted messages, there is no
possibility of parsing/interpretation, unless the rendezvous modules
are trusted with the broker's long-term decryption key.
- A single DNS query doesn't have enough room to contain a client
registration. (Needs about 1500 bytes or 500 bytes if compressed,
about 140 bytes are available.) We wondered if some domain-aware
compression could shrink the message enough: stripping out fields we
know are implied or unnecessary, and reinserting them on receipt. On a
quick inspection, the a=fingerprint field is 32 bytes of
non-compressible data, and a=ice-ufrag and a=ice-pwd are 16 and 24
bytes of high-entropy data.
- Currently, the broker may return both status code 503 (Service
Unavailable) and 504 (Gateway Timeout):
https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/snowflake.git/tree/broker/broker.go?id=0054cb2dec19e89e07b8c5a6d8b9d23589842deb#n292
https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/snowflake.git/tree/broker/broker.go?id=0054cb2dec19e89e07b8c5a6d8b9d23589842deb#n317
but the client only knows about 503, handling 504 in a default case:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/snowflake.git/tree/client/lib/rendezvous.go?id=0054cb2dec19e89e07b8c5a6d8b9d23589842deb#n139
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