On 1/9/2013 4:41 AM, Konstantinos
Asimakis wrote:
for our purposes, "they" can remain undefined.
there are plenty of "they"s to pick from, what with illegal NSA
wiretapping, various alphabet soup brigades targeting their own
citizens, staggeringly escalated mandatory data retention, new
anti-piracy techniques and legal precedants that allow various
copyright owners to attack their own customers and clients, the list
goes on and on.
And that's just the USA. once you include things like
publically-admitted cooperative domestic espionage between allied
countries, and other foreign powers such as China, Russia, North
Korea, and just about every Arab country in existence, there are a
multitude of "they"s to be cautious about.
Though, speaking as someone with an anarchist cypherpunk bent, I
don't really need an excuse to take whatever precautions are
available to me, seeing as any sort of activism or participation in
social movements would cause me to be a political target.
The only reason I'm posting here at all is because I do not think I
am yet a target valuable enough to actually pursue.
When I say "entry guards" i mean entry guards from the perspective
of a tor node acting as a client.
Am i mistaken in believing that a tor bridge relay acts as a client
on behalf of the actual tor client behind it?
Or does the short list of bridge relays act as entry guards, and
connect to other tor relays as the first hop tor relay?