Given the current state of the internet (ie, massive warrantless spying by LEO's and packet inspection by ISP's) I cannot imagine how any TOR operator would block encrypted services and not be what most reasonable people consider a "Bad exit".
On 2015-10-29 14:05, Mike Perry wrote:
Green Dream:Mirimir: aside from the nickname, do you have any reason to believe it was out of the ordinary? The exit policy mostly only seems to allow non-encrypted services (80 but not 443, 143A while ago we were actively marking nodes that only allowed non-encrypted services as BadExit, since there were no satisfactory explanations given as to why nodes should need this policy. Back then, the most common explanation people gave was "I need the ability to block traffic that looks evil." Unfortunately, all mechanisms available to do this will also end up blocking legitimate content at some rate. Nobody was using anything more advanced than snort-style regular expressions that matched things that happened to look like exploits. FWIW, I am personally in favor of reinstating such a policy. I doubt the situation has changed.
_______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays