P.S:
If this is a client to guard detection only, then why does my exit node also block a significant amount of DoS (I had around the same statistics when my guard probability fraction was still zero, so clearly something is working):
Aug 09 21:08:36 matrix tor[XXX]: Aug 09 21:08:36.000 [notice] Heartbeat: DoS mitigation since startup: 6 circuits killed with too many cells, 865308797 circuits rejected, 691 marked addresses, 0 marked addresses for max queue, 0 same address concurrent connections rejected, 0 connections rejected, 0 single hop clients refused, 0 INTRODUCE2 rejected.
George
On Friday, August 9th, 2024 at 8:59 PM, boldsuck lists@for-privacy.net wrote:
On Mittwoch, 7. August 2024 14:30:27 CEST George Hartley via tor-relays wrote:
This is already impossible, as both circuit and concurrent connection DoS
both gets detected and the IP in question flagged and blacklisted.No.
DoS has been a topic of conversation at nearly all relay meetings for over 2
years. Enkidu and Toralf have developed Tor-ddos IPtables rules for the
community. Article10 specifically for Tor exits and trinity has developed the
patch.https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40676
Roger, Mike, Nick and Perry certainly wouldn't have let Trinity develop the
feature if the current DoS mitigations in Tor had helped.Please see the manual on this:
https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en#DoSCircuitCreationEn
abledThis is a client to relay detection only. "auto" means use the consensus
parameter. (Default: auto)
It is defined in the consensus:
https://consensus-health.torproject.org/#consensusparamsExample: 500K connections from IP 1.2.3.4
These are numbers from reality and not fantasy.
AFAIK, Article10 and relayon already had 1,000,000 connections per IP!--
╰_╯ Ciao Marco!Debian GNU/Linux
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