This is just plain FUD, what you're doing now.

The 3 letter agencies have known about tor, and have been complaining that they can't break it, for a long time now. In fact (iirc), they even supported its development at some point, because they use it themselves. The fact that they're using it is no reason for concern, rather the opposite, since that means, they trust its security enough, that they think other states can't break it.

That this guy is an ex-cia, also isn't a problem in and of itself. It's just like hiring an ex-criminal for your security company. He could fuck you over big time, or he could be a great asset due to insider knowledge. Snowden is also ex-cia, ffs.

Also, what should he have "put in place"? A backdoor in the sourcecode? It's open source, so we can see what he added. Compromised the DirAuths? They're run by people not directly associated with the board, who (hopefully) wouldn't simply give out their private keys. Installed wiretapping? He doesn't need to be member of the board to do that.

So maybe you should heed your own advice and think!


(sorry for the rant, guys...)


Am 03.09.2016 um 12:34 schrieb daniel boone:
This is upsetting on what  I hear and see not. I worked my ass off to get my relay, now i hear of a strike  and tor hireing a ex-cia offical. Even though i read the resigned, that still does not make the difference does it. They have already got in and probably long enough to put in place what the corrupt US Govt  wants to do. They have even admitted they know about tor, some military usess it, but they cant penetrate it. Maybe we should all think
 
Sent: Friday, September 02, 2016 at 7:56 PM
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Today's Topics:

1. Re: #torstrike (D.S. Ljungmark)
2. Re: #torstrike (Volker Mink)
3. Guard vs Exit Bandwidth (Tristan)
4. Re: Guard vs Exit Bandwidth (Green Dream)
5. Re: Guard vs Exit Bandwidth (Tristan)
6. Re: total relay bandwidth (grarpamp)


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 17:26:35 +0200
From: "D.S. Ljungmark" <spider@takeit.se>
To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
Message-ID: <e91d9a79-b03e-01b6-28b9-2efcb5ebba58@takeit.se>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

I just multiplied my BandwidthRate with a bit for my exit.

//Spid


On 02/09/16 02:28, Tristan wrote:
> Is the Tor strike today? Because I just set up a second instance on my
> relay to get the most out of its bandwidth.
>
> Oops 😏
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
>

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Message: 2
Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 17:33:54 +0200
From: Volker Mink <volker.mink@gmx.de>
To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-relays] #torstrike
Message-ID: <5AD00FAC-7313-4EE3-A0DC-AA404DB25305@gmx.de>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

Good job, thank you!

> Am 02.09.2016 um 17:26 schrieb D.S. Ljungmark <spider@takeit.se>:
>
> I just multiplied my BandwidthRate with a bit for my exit.
>
> //Spid
>
>
>> On 02/09/16 02:28, Tristan wrote:
>> Is the Tor strike today? Because I just set up a second instance on my
>> relay to get the most out of its bandwidth.
>>
>> Oops 😏
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> tor-relays mailing list
>> tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
>
> _______________________________________________
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
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Message: 3
Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 12:24:22 -0500
From: Tristan <supersluether@gmail.com>
To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
Subject: [tor-relays] Guard vs Exit Bandwidth
Message-ID:
<CAKkV4FEWg6u1EmU-vit_9UbBxd5FS3HufD1g8ovy4iUgz-Wnuw@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

Looking at the advertised bandwidth vs bandwidth history from Tor
Metrics[1], it appears that guard relays see much more traffic than exit
relays. I think it might be partially because guard-only, guard-middle and
guard-exits aren't separated, but would it really skew the numbers that
much?

[1]http://rougmnvswfsmd4dq.onion/bandwidth-flags.html

--
Finding information, passing it along. ~SuperSluether
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Message: 4
Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 10:51:08 -0700
From: Green Dream <greendream848@gmail.com>
To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Guard vs Exit Bandwidth
Message-ID:
<CAAd2PDJM+noPH+E4EwzhH_UOTKdva1DduaOe7v=hbKxm05LETw@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

Don't forget that some traffic enters through guards but lands on
hidden services, skipping Exits.


------------------------------

Message: 5
Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 12:53:40 -0500
From: Tristan <supersluether@gmail.com>
To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-relays] Guard vs Exit Bandwidth
Message-ID:
<CAKkV4FGhqFP-vuePwmq0+6sdiqvxFFdUQhQeUb8TuUSedOXkSQ@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

But hidden service traffic makes up about 0.01% of Tor traffic.

Total is about 75Gb/s: http://rougmnvswfsmd4dq.onion/bandwidth.html

Hidden services are about 900Mb/s:
http://rougmnvswfsmd4dq.onion/hidserv-rend-relayed-cells.html

On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 12:51 PM, Green Dream <greendream848@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Don't forget that some traffic enters through guards but lands on
> hidden services, skipping Exits.
> _______________________________________________
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
>



--
Finding information, passing it along. ~SuperSluether
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Message: 6
Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 15:55:49 -0400
From: grarpamp <grarpamp@gmail.com>
To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-relays] total relay bandwidth
Message-ID:
<CAD2Ti28WQqFCBTKS8UTiGO0fbHH=u+ek5g57V+_xYunhNyVvMw@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 7:30 AM, Michael Armbruster <tor@armbrust.me> wrote:
> On 2016-09-02 at 13:18, jensm1 wrote:
>> which shows that the advertised relay bandwidth in the whole network is
>> more than double the actually used bandwidth. While it's certainly nice
>> to have a bit of breathing space to absorb load spikes, I'm wondering,

> it's always good to have even more relays or exit nodes, as more "hop
> points" for connections means more diversity throughout the network

Once a net reaches adequate bandwidth capacity, adding more
nodes can do a few things among others...
Good:
- Gives operators deployment experience till their bw is needed, at $cost.
- More non-evil relays gives better odds of building a non-evil path, but tor
weight's things so not exactly.
- May add some capacity for directory operations etc
Bad:
- Yields rather unused nodes making it easier for passive
observer to see you tack up and use a path through them,
especially if you're crafting paths.

One key here is probably that we don't have a good idea as to the
quantity of evil nodes, or the hard interest and real capabilities of PA's.

To make the call you'd need that, and perf metrics of your net under
different ratios of advertised:consumed:nodecount, and min/avg/max/stddev
of idle/random/full paths, to find any sweet spots / ranges.

Also considerations of impact adding nodes of less bandwidth or
more latency than average, versus a campaign to fund replace them.

At 42% util by one metric, it may be money and time better spent
elsewhere, even on better qualifying the default 'more nodes good' idea.


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