I would argue that the existence of this longer policy discussion, with no obvious solution, is why it behoves us to separate policy (as much as possible) from Tor's core mechanism.
-V
Quoting Tim Wilson-Brown - teor <teor2345@gmail.com>:
> If we ensure that Exits must pass some encrypted traffic, then
> running an Exit is less attractive to an adversary.
I'd argue that it's marginally less attractive. They still have the
opportunity to inspect some unencrypted traffic.
> And even adversaries contribute useful, secure bandwidth to the Tor Network.
This could also potentially backfire: adversaries can create local
(non-tor) policies to throttle encrypted exit traffic, while not
throttling unencrypted traffic.
Peter..
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