On 24 Sep 2015, at 23:10, Thomas White <thomaswhite@riseup.net> wrote:Signed PGP partCould we perhaps expand the contact information field in some way? Onething I was pondering a while ago was a social contact, not just anemail address. I raised a very brief point about this with Virgil inParis last year, but I think I made it very poorly at the time as Ijust come up with it on the spot.To assign an email address is good for email communications and usingPGP and so forth, but also allowing another handle such as a Twitterusername would be a way to create further credibility of diversity.For example, my following on Twitter is quite diverse and it would behard to argue I was a government proxy or so on. If many operatorshave Twitter handles where the information and identity is publicanyway, having a second option to tie into those social parameterswould be more transparent in the people running those relays if theychose to be. For example, I have no problem in being open on some ofthe projects I am working on, and I'm sure moving into a social spherecould have a positive effect on Tor in general in terms of trust.For example, let's say the contact box lacks an email, we could see ifthere was a way for reaching out to people via Twitter to let themknow a relay is outdated instead of private email reminders.Anyway I am rambling on a bit there, but my point is getting people touse not just email, but also tie into a twitter account or somethingof that nature would make it clearer that Tor is not run almostexclusively by the military or whatever, since that kind of open datawith aliases and Twitter feeds connected to the relay ownership isresearchable if people, like Transparency Toolkit, wanted to "check usout" so to speak. To verify the data, we could make Roster have asmall verification step, just a "tweet this code to verify this isyour account" and then Roster can store the URL to this tweet tomaintain an independent proof that alias controls which relay, similarto how Keybase does it.