Tor Operator:
Hello Georg,
The relay fingerprint is:
9A156D69784669874456A67E7210F80867E3F1FC
Yes, I have configured the maximum bandwidth that I can provide to 90.00 MiB/s approximately and i'm interested in buying more bandwidth if all is consumed.
For now the problem is solved by raising the swap memory from 100mb to 8gb, restarting the server and the TOR service, maybe that can help in future DDoS attacks that may reach my node.
Right. Raising the swap limit seemed like another solid guess given the screenshots you sent, nice.
Taking advantage of this communication, I am not sure why TOR cannot consume more bandwidth. The maximum it can consume in bursts is 24.00 MiB/s but in TOR Metrics I can only see a bandwidth of 4.76 MiB/s.
It is likely that the reason that more bandwidth cannot be consumed, is that the nodes are mostly in Europe and the communication latency to South America is not efficient to build circuits?
No, the value you see in Advertised Bandwidth is not related to any measurements being done (to estimate your bandwidth) nor related to build times of circuits. It's the minimum of what you configured for your relay and recently observed traffic. So, it *could* be that you are affected by data transfer bottlenecks from South America to, say, Europe or the US but that's hard to say. Either way, having a relay where you have it right now is highly valuable as we get more diversity into our network that way. So, please keep it there if possible, regardless whether you currently max out your bw or not.
Thanks for running a relay, Georg
Thanks for your reply.
El mar, 8 nov 2022 a la(s) 04:30, Georg Koppen (gk@torproject.org) escribió:
Tor Operator:
Hello, My relay is continuously overloaded, so I have activated MetricsPort to obtain information.
Great! Which relay is that?
According to the documentation it seems to be a CPU problem, but the CPU consumption level has enough resources and at the RAM level I also have available resources.
Can you help to solve the problem? I can provide up to 90Mbps of
bandwidth
but it seems unable to consume all the bandwidth. The server runs on a RaspBerry PI 4 - 8GB - 4CPU
Have you tested the MaxAdvertisedBandwidth option to check whether it solves your problem? Note that Tor is to a large extent single-threaded and it's enough to get one burst of dropped ntor onionskins to get the overload flag for about 24h.
Does the issue still show up? Since 10/28 it seems our DoS situation improved greatly (although no one knows how long this will last).
Thanks, Georg
[image: imagen.png]
[image: imagen.png] [image: imagen.png]
# HELP tor_relay_load_oom_bytes_total Total number of bytes the OOM has freed by subsystem # TYPE tor_relay_load_oom_bytes_total counter tor_relay_load_oom_bytes_total{subsys="cell"} 0 tor_relay_load_oom_bytes_total{subsys="dns"} 0 tor_relay_load_oom_bytes_total{subsys="geoip"} 0 tor_relay_load_oom_bytes_total{subsys="hsdir"} 0 # HELP tor_relay_load_global_rate_limit_reached_total Total number of global connection bucket limit reached # TYPE tor_relay_load_global_rate_limit_reached_total counter tor_relay_load_global_rate_limit_reached_total{side="read"} 0 tor_relay_load_global_rate_limit_reached_total{side="write"} 0 # HELP tor_relay_load_socket_total Total number of sockets # TYPE tor_relay_load_socket_total gauge tor_relay_load_socket_total{state="opened"} 4997 tor_relay_load_socket_total 65504 # HELP tor_relay_load_onionskins_total Total number of onionskins handled # TYPE tor_relay_load_onionskins_total counter tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="tap",action="processed"} 16911 tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="tap",action="dropped"} 0 tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="fast",action="processed"} 0 tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="fast",action="dropped"} 0 tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="ntor",action="processed"} 13827588 tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="ntor",action="dropped"} 179371 tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="ntor_v3",action="processed"}
13827588
tor_relay_load_onionskins_total{type="ntor_v3",action="dropped"} 179371 # HELP tor_relay_exit_dns_query_total Total number of DNS queries done by this relay # TYPE tor_relay_exit_dns_query_total counter tor_relay_exit_dns_query_total 0 # HELP tor_relay_exit_dns_error_total Total number of DNS errors encountered by this relay # TYPE tor_relay_exit_dns_error_total counter tor_relay_exit_dns_error_total{reason="success"} 0 tor_relay_exit_dns_error_total{reason="format"} 0 tor_relay_exit_dns_error_total{reason="serverfailed"} 0 tor_relay_exit_dns_error_total{reason="notexist"} 0 tor_relay_exit_dns_error_total{reason="notimpl"} 0 tor_relay_exit_dns_error_total{reason="refused"} 0 tor_relay_exit_dns_error_total{reason="truncated"} 0 tor_relay_exit_dns_error_total{reason="unknown"} 0 tor_relay_exit_dns_error_total{reason="tor_timeout"} 0 tor_relay_exit_dns_error_total{reason="shutdown"} 0 tor_relay_exit_dns_error_total{reason="cancel"} 0 tor_relay_exit_dns_error_total{reason="nodata"} 0 # HELP tor_relay_load_tcp_exhaustion_total Total number of times we ran
out
of TCP ports # TYPE tor_relay_load_tcp_exhaustion_total counter tor_relay_load_tcp_exhaustion_total 0