<html><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><br><div><div>On May 25, 2010, at 2:45 AM, Scott Bennett wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite"><div> I don't know who "Censorship Research Center" might be, but they claim<br>to have a development project going for another encrypted proxy service.<br>However, they say it will be free software, but *not* be open source, so no<br>one can examine what they have done in order to look for bugs, design flaws,<br>etc. :-( There isn't much real information at the web site,<font class="Apple-style-span" color="#000000"><font class="Apple-style-span" color="#144FAE"><br></font></font></div></blockquote><br>Without the community support, I wonder how quickly it could be adopted. I'm assuming it's going to rely on user-run exits like Tor, and I wonder how many large contributors would be willing to install closed-source software that they're not involved in developing on their servers.</div><div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div>but what little there is looks very much like an attempt to sucker people<br>who don't understand much about security.<br> Oh. I almost forgot. Their FAQ page mentions tor, complaining about<br>tor's publicly available directory and arguing that their method is better,<br>while not mentioning bridges.<br></div></blockquote><div><br></div>Haters' gonn' hate. I'll admit, though, that using bridges might be a bit above the "average" user, especially when it comes to finding them. Not exactly plug-n-play. I also don't see why it would be terribly difficult for a sufficiently determined government to amass a large list of bridges and make that option essentially (if not completely) inviable.</div><div><br></div><div>I am a tad unnerved at the number of links to the donation page, though I appreciate the costs associated with such an endeavor.</div><div><br></div><div>~japlin</div><div><br></div></body></html>