<div dir="ltr"><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Sep 5, 2008 at 8:48 AM, Gregory Maxwell <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:gmaxwell@gmail.com">gmaxwell@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
<div class="Ih2E3d">On Fri, Sep 5, 2008 at 11:08 AM, Nick Mathewson <<a href="mailto:nickm@freehaven.net">nickm@freehaven.net</a>> wrote:<br>
> I dig what I've heard of the Chrome architecture, but it seems clear<br>
> that, like every other consumer browser, it's not suitable for<br>
> anonymous browsing out-of-the-box. The real question will be how easy<br>
> it is to adapt it to be safe. Torbutton, for instance, has proven to<br>
> take some pretty extreme hackery to try to shut down all of Firefox's<br>
> interesting leaks. If it turned out to be (say) an order of magnitude<br>
> easier to extend Chrome to be anonymity-friendly, that would be pretty<br>
> awesome. We'll see, I guess.<br>
</div>[snip]<br>
<br>
Why aren't more people using virtual machines for anonymous browsing?<br>
<br>
If your VM can't access the outside world except via TOR, and it has<br>
no knowledge of the outside world information (because TOR itself is<br>
running on the real machine) then pretty much all possible leaks are<br>
closed and you're only vulnerable to leakage between multiple<br>
anonymous things. Very simple, very clean.<br>
</blockquote></div><br>You sir are spot on! Multiple VMs is the way to go. :)<br><br></div>