Well, kind of. Imagine if a person constantly download a ton of data (say a large iso for several hours). That person would be seen as "the person". So you have to differentiate yourself from other traffic to conclusively prove it was you. Now, a much more effective means is to go "these 10 people connected between 1 and 3 pm as we know our suspect did. In that case, we can do background checks on them and rule out certain individuals". If you're leaking internal CIA documents or fighting any adversary of that skill, I don't think tor is strong enough and you should never ever ever challenge a government agency of that type of strength regardless of the legality of your activity from your home connection.
<br>Comrade Ringo Kamens<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Jan 11, 2008 5:02 PM, Jon McLachlan <<a href="mailto:mcla0181@umn.edu">mcla0181@umn.edu</a>> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
(please correct me if I'm incorrect but...)<br><br>if the adversary controls your entry-guard (which is nearly impossible<br>to detect and considered a 'strong' adversary)<br>if the adversary controls input to your tunnel (like text in an email,
<br>which is easy)<br>and, if you do not use end to end encryption,<br><br>Then, the adversary can perform traffic analysis on the exit node, and<br>the adversary can easily discover your true ip.<br><font color="#888888">
<br><br>~Jon<br></font></blockquote></div><br>