<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1"
http-equiv="Content-Type">
<title></title>
</head>
<body bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000">
Seth David Schoen wrote:<br>
<span style="white-space: pre;">> * timing of access (what time
zone are you in, when do you usually do<br>
> something?) -- for communications with non-randomized latency
< 1 day<br>
><br>
> * typing patterns (cf. Cliff Stoll's _Cuckoo's Egg_ and the Song
et al. paper)<br>
><br>
> * typing speed</span><br>
A question crept up to me and this thread seems the right place to ask<br>
it (although it certainly has been asked before).<br>
If I cause a lot of meaningless traffic over tor, couldn't I hide<br>
meaningful traffic in this noise and thus be secure against timing<br>
attacks? Say, I start a large download and visit a website while it<br>
runs. Wouldn't a global observer only see the net traffic coming from<br>
my node? Wouldn't this make it impossible for them to correlate this<br>
traffic with the traffic at the website I visited?<br>
<br>
<br>
</body>
</html>