<br><div><span class="gmail_quote">On 5/17/06, <b class="gmail_sendername">Peter Palfrader</b> <<a href="mailto:peter@palfrader.org">peter@palfrader.org</a>> wrote:</span><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
On Wed, 17 May 2006, Michael Holstein wrote:<br><br>> >You are hurting the Tor network more than you realize. You are lying to<br>> >clients and clients cache that answer. Don't do this.</blockquote><div><br>
</div></div>I don't think it is as bad as that, seeing as the
'blocked' addresses would not be accessible from most other exit nodes
either. Having said that, I certainly agree that it is never good to
break DNS lookups.<br>
<br>
Perhaps a reasonable solution might be to redirect requests for
journals back through tor (after telling the client not to trust your
exit node, so as to avoid possible cycles)? It would obviously be
inappropriate if the amount of
expected traffic was non-trivial, but in this case it might work well. <br>
<br>
Alternatively, I don't think it would cause much inconvenience if
requests for IP-authenticated webpages were simply routed to an error page
that said "Sorry, but I cannot connect to the IP address you requested. You
may want to explicitly select another exit node".<br>
<br>
TU<br>