<div>Perhaps you can do this:</div>
<div>firefox-->privoxy-->SOCKS proxy 1-->SOCKS proxy 2-->tor-->internet</div>
<div>This way, even if they could determine "your" ip, they would get the IPs of your proxy which is re-routing encrypted tor traffic.<br><br> </div>
<div><span class="gmail_quote">On 4/28/06, <b class="gmail_sendername">Paul Syverson</b> <<a href="mailto:syverson@itd.nrl.navy.mil">syverson@itd.nrl.navy.mil</a>> wrote:</span>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="PADDING-LEFT: 1ex; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid">On Fri, Apr 28, 2006 at 02:35:16PM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote:<br>><br>> You can find out more about the last 25 years of anonymity research at
<br>> <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/">http://freehaven.net/anonbib/</a> .<br>><br><br>To reinforce, most of what has been raised in this thread has been<br>raised (often years ago) and subjected to lots of published
<br>analysis. The tradeoffs between anonymity and practicality continue to<br>evolve, but if you have a thought off the top of your head, there's a<br>good chance it's already reflected in the literature. Keep thinking<br>
about it and raising questions/comments, but do also have a look at<br>the extensive research that's been done in this area.<br><br>One paper that isn't posted in the anonbib (yet) shows some timing<br>attacks confirmed via experiments on the Tor network and
<br>countermeasures to them. See<br><a href="http://www.onion-router.net/Publications.html#locating-hidden-servers">http://www.onion-router.net/Publications.html#locating-hidden-servers</a><br><br>There were also a different sort of timing attack conducted on a
<br>younger and much smaller Tor network. See<br>"Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor" in the anonbib.<br><br>aloha,<br>Paul<br></blockquote></div><br>