Perhaps the server could insert short (randomized) delays between recieving a request and relaying it.<br><br>
<div><span class="gmail_quote">On 4/15/06, <b class="gmail_sendername">Paul Syverson</b> <<a href="mailto:syverson@itd.nrl.navy.mil">syverson@itd.nrl.navy.mil</a>> wrote:</span>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="PADDING-LEFT: 1ex; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid">On Sat, Apr 15, 2006 at 07:30:48PM +0200, Nils Vogels wrote:<br>> On 4/15/06, 2600denver <<a href="mailto:2600denver@gmail.com">
2600denver@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>> ><br>> > Does this seem like a plausable solution to stop timing and point-to-point<br>> > attacks?<br>><br>> Yes it most probably does,<br><br>Actually, no it doesn't
<br><a href="http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#YouShouldPad">http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#YouShouldPad</a><br><br>And such attacks can be real<br><a href="http://www.onion-router.net/Publications.html#locating-hidden-servers">
http://www.onion-router.net/Publications.html#locating-hidden-servers</a><br><br>> but it also effectively slows down the<br>> entire Tor network bij 66%, at least when you are counting the cover<br>> traffic in the bandwidth limits that you set for tor traffic.
<br>><br><br>Yep.<br><br>-Paul<br></blockquote></div><br>