[tor-talk] I have a quick question about security of tor with 3 nodes

Aymeric Vitte vitteaymeric at gmail.com
Mon Sep 1 09:38:40 UTC 2014


Restoring the right subject for this thread...

Maybe in the context of the Tor network it would not be very useful and 
safe but probably there is still an interest that the first node does 
not know it is the first one, not sure it's really possible for the Tor 
network since as you mention it's probably not very difficult for a node 
to find out that it is the first one.

Regards,

Le 31/08/2014 22:54, Charles Thomas a écrit :
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> As long as the current guard model is in place then the relay could
> probably tell if its a client vs bridge by the frequency of visit. I'm
> assuming that a client visits one of its guard more often on average
> then a random bridge would connect to that guard. There is probably
> something in the code that tells the node which spot they are in.
>
> The network would be slightly less secure because the chances of
> having the first and last node would be improved, making correlation
> attacks easier. It would how ever not be a third easier though,
> because of Guards and exits wouldn't be used (much) as a middle node.
>
> On 08/31/2014 05:00 AM, tor-talk-request at lists.torproject.org wrote:
>> Let's imagine the Tor network is choosing 2 or 3 nodes, the first
>> node would not be able to know it is the first one (because it does
>> not know if the path is 2 or 3 nodes), it could check that the IPs
>> are not belonging to the Tor network and then find out that it is
>> the first one, but these IPs could be secret bridges, so it might
>> not be really sure it is the first one.
>> But maybe the benefit of such proposal (if proven safe) would be
>> too small in the context of the Tor network compared to the
>> traditionnal three nodes selection.
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