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<body class='hmmessage'><div dir='ltr'>There should be a way to auth via letsencrypt.org, anonymously.<br><br><div>To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org<br>From: kernelcorn@riseup.net<br>Date: Tue, 29 Dec 2015 12:27:06 -0900<br>Subject: Re: [tor-relays] tor hidden services & SSL EV certificate<br><br><pre>On 12/29/2015 11:18 AM, Aeris wrote:<br>>> A few hidden services have added an<br>>> HTTPS cert but I think that's mostly for a publicity stunt than anything<br>>> else.<br>> <br>> As indicated in the roger’s lecture, HTTPS is usefull for HS :<br>> - browsers handle more securely cookies or other stuff in HTTPS mode, <br>> avoiding some possible leaks<br>> - because anybody can create an HS and proxify any content, X.509 certs <br>> allow users to verify the authenticity of the HS (you are on the official <br>> Facebook HS if you have a cert with facebook.com *AND* facebookcorewwwi.onion <br>> inside)<br>> <br> <br>I've downloaded the .webm of Roger's lecture but haven't had the time<br>today to listen to it. My point was that HSs already have an<br>authentication mechanism and it's assumed that you can verify the<br>address through some trusted out-of-band method, so in that case you<br>don't need an SSL cert. This can sometimes be superior to trusting the<br>centralized CA model, but I agree that the points you've listed are<br>useful applications as well.<br> <br>-- <br>Jesse V<br> <br></pre><br>_______________________________________________
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