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<div><span _style="font-size:12.8px">Green,<br><br>>>Can you please elaborate? I may have
missed an earlier discussion, and a quick Google search isn't providing
too much help. I found the ticket >>below, which is interesting reading,
but I'm not sure what specific peculiarities you're referring to.</span><br><br>One problem I understood which was a mystery was DOS attack which could be explained by ...<br>The NTP service could allow for multiple sync requests to be made with a
forged source IP address, thus sending the unrequested responses back
to the source, consuming its resources. An attacker could exploit this
vulnerability by sending a specifically crafted packet with a forged
source IP address of the target.</div>[ https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-14-051-04 ]<br><br>and another was around about a year ago but no tinkering with ntp gave relief (as far as I understood).<br><pre><span class="EMV-q">Sep 02 03:48:32.146 [Warning] Received NETINFO cell with skewed time</span>
<span class="EMV-q">> from server at 128.31.0.34:9101. It seems that our clock is ahead by 9</span>
<span class="EMV-q">> hours, 0 minutes, or that theirs is behind. Tor requires an accurate</span>
<span class="EMV-q">> clock to work: please check your time and date settings.</span></pre>The skewing of the ntp time to reveal identity wasn't something I'd heard of so thank you for that ticket link.<br><span style="font-size:12.8px"><a target="_blank" href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8170">https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8170</a><br><br></span>Robert<br><br>
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