[tor-relays] Handling abuse - like to get your help please

pa011 pa011 at web.de
Tue Jun 21 14:36:46 UTC 2016


Jon, all others,

yes I understand what you say and obviously have to accept the ISP's
wishes (order).

But before giving up a 100Mbit/s exit I would like to understand more
about the ISP's reasons and burdens:

- is it just the more work for rather poor money handling(forwarding)
those abuses ?
- to whom else dose he have to report what he is doing with the gotten
abuses?
- must he answer to the origin of the abuse?
- who is getting a copy of them(if at all)?
- can he loose his license as a ISP (with to many or badly handled abuses)?
- are there any regulatory burdens for them - if so which ones?
- are ISP's treated different in different parts of the world?

Answers here might help me and others in bringing forward the discussion
with them.

Paul


Am 21.06.2016 um 15:38 schrieb BlinkTor:
> On Jun 20, 2016, at 4:19 AM, pa011 <pa011 at web.de> wrote:
>>
>> Hi all,
>>
>> thanks again for your hints - in my case they obviously find Tor less
>> fancy - their response today is following:
>>
>> "Hello.
>> You need to take steps to ensure that the complaint would be no longer
>> received.
>> This software is only allowed if there are no complaints on the server."
>>
>> As I cant close Port 80 and the next attack would be a different target
>> I guess there is not much room for response :-(
>>
>> Rgds
>>
>> Paul
> 
> 
> Paul,
> 
> This is a recurring issue that will not go away, because protecting malicious traffic is part of the foundational Tor philosophy. Tor very intentionally has no ability (beyond rudimentary port/host blocking) to control the type of traffic it carries, there are no plans to add any sort of IDS functionality, and filtering exit relay traffic is frowned upon by the Tor community. This is why abuse reports happen, and it's the primary reason that Tor relays are blocked by so many services—typically not because folks are against personal privacy, but because they simply take a very practical approach to network security. So, if you (or your ISP) determine that the benefits of Tor aren’t compelling enough to turn a blind eye to malicious Tor traffic and the abuse reports it generates, then your only real options are to either not run an exit, or not run Tor at all.
> 
> That’s just the way it is.
> 
> Jon
> 
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