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<div class="">Hi Ron!</div>
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<div class="">I know that a select few public SSL certificates have been issued for .onion domains, but I understand that the status of those certs is tenuous.</div>
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<div>Apologies for contradicting you, but there is nothing "tenuous" about Onion certificates. </div>
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<div>They are fully fledged, official certificates, and the domain-related issues have all been solved.</div>
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<div>The open issue, if any, is that such certificates are "EV"-style, and as such are only really open to companies because background checks.</div>
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<div>I outline the issue here: <a href="http://dropsafe.crypticide.com/article/11697" class="">http://dropsafe.crypticide.com/article/11697</a> - take note especially of the comments, which leads to some commentary on the relevant maillist from key members
of CABForum.</div>
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<div class="">Has anyone considered implementing a custom certificate service just for .onions? If the Tor Browser shipped with an additional root certificate, that certificate could be used to sign .onion domains.</div>
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<div>My feelings regards such a proposal are "that would work, yes, but that would put Onions into a 'SSL Ghetto' and inhibit adoption of Onion technologies by 'normal' browsers".</div>
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<div>Further than that, I believe that the proper approach is to obtain CABForum backing for DV, AV or IV certificates for Onion sites. See <a href="http://dropsafe.crypticide.com/article/11697" class="">http://dropsafe.crypticide.com/article/11697</a> for
explanation of unfamiliar acronyms.</div>
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<div class="">Proof of ownership of .onion domains is relatively easy to ascertain.
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<div>Ballot-144 <a href="https://cabforum.org/2015/02/18/ballot-144-validation-rules-dot-onion-names/" class="">https://cabforum.org/2015/02/18/ballot-144-validation-rules-dot-onion-names/</a> describes two methods to do so, but in truth at least one of them
is not as good as I would like to see.</div>
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<div>Note also the concerns expressed by Ryan Sleevi at <a href="https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2015-November/006213.html" class="">https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2015-November/006213.html</a></div>
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<div>These are concerns which must be addressed (or constructively negated) to _some_ extent, to pursue Onion DV certs a-la LetsEncrypt.</div>
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<div class="">I haven't looked at the problem in detail, but I believe that a fully-automated process could issue certs for arbitrary .onion domains encrypted with the domain's public key. Only the domain owner would have the private key to decrypt and install
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<div>Yes, that could happen. That's one of the methods suggested in Ballot-144. The CABForum have somewhat justified concerns with that mechanism, mostly regards revocation, Onion certificate theft, and SHA hash-collisions.</div>
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<div>The Certificate/CABForum world has grown up in partnership with capabilities like taking domain-name dispute resolution to some kind of arbiter, but Onionspace lacks such - onions are much more binary, hinging upon possession of the Onion key. </div>
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<div>This means that CABForum needs gentle introduction to wholesale change. The establishment of more 'official' SSL/EV keys in Onionspace will make an argument for further growth.</div>
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<div class=""><a href="http://torproject.org" class="">torproject.org</a> would have to be willing to ship the Tor Browser with the necessary root certificate, but the root would not need the blessing of the CA/Browser Forum or any other authority figure.<br class="">
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<div>In summary, I repeat, I feel this would address a short-term, TorBrowserBundle need, but cause harm elsewhere to the greater world's adoption of Onions.</div>
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<div> -a</div>
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