<div dir="ltr">i wonder if you could recommend me what i can do to make such a thing, or someone who can, you see i am an it student and im eager to learn how i can make these kind of things and contribute to the tor project, but i need help from other people to accomplish this.<br></div><div id="DDB4FAA8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2"><br>
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</table><a href="#DDB4FAA8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2" width="1" height="1"></a></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On 26 February 2016 at 14:53, Michael Rogers <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:michael@briarproject.org" target="_blank">michael@briarproject.org</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">As far as I can tell, this would work, and you could do it without any<br>
changes to the Tor network. Just set up a hidden service where the<br>
service is an open proxy.<br>
<br>
It wouldn't be transparent to clients, however - they'd need to do some<br>
proxychains-style juggling to connect to their local onion proxy, then<br>
connect through that to your hidden service, then connect through that<br>
to the internet. You could of course create a library to do the extra<br>
work on the client side - but the point is, it wouldn't work for<br>
unmodified clients.<br>
<br>
But perhaps the bigger problem with hidden exit nodes is that when<br>
someone does something illegal through your exit node and the police<br>
come to your door, you can't point to the public list of exit nodes and<br>
say "It wasn't me, I'm just an exit node". The best you can do is point<br>
to the hidden exit nodes library and say "It might not have been me,<br>
anyone could be an exit node".<br>
<br>
Cheers,<br>
Michael<br>
<span class=""><br>
On 25/02/16 22:06, blacklight . wrote:<br>
> About the issue of exit nodes needing to know to which bridge they need<br>
> to connect to, could we not make a system that similair to hidden<br>
> services, so that the nodes can connect to them without knowing the<br>
> actulle ip adress? If we could design an automatic system in which flash<br>
> proxies could be configered like that, then it might work i think, what<br>
> are your thoughts?<br>
><br>
> Op 25 feb. 2016 22:37 schreef "Thom Wiggers" <<a href="mailto:torlists@thomwiggers.nl">torlists@thomwiggers.nl</a><br>
</span>> <mailto:<a href="mailto:torlists@thomwiggers.nl">torlists@thomwiggers.nl</a>>>:<br>
<div><div class="h5">><br>
> You may be interested in the following from the FAQ:<br>
><br>
> <a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#HideExits" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#HideExits</a><br>
><br>
> You should hide the list of Tor relays, so people can't block the exits.<br>
><br>
> There are a few reasons we don't:<br>
><br>
> a) We can't help but make the information available, since Tor<br>
> clients need to use it to pick their paths. So if the "blockers"<br>
> want it, they can get it anyway. Further, even if we didn't tell<br>
> clients about the list of relays directly, somebody could still make<br>
> a lot of connections through Tor to a test site and build a list of<br>
> the addresses they see.<br>
> b) If people want to block us, we believe that they should be<br>
> allowed to do so. Obviously, we would prefer for everybody to allow<br>
> Tor users to connect to them, but people have the right to decide<br>
> who their services should allow connections from, and if they want<br>
> to block anonymous users, they can.<br>
> c) Being blockable also has tactical advantages: it may be a<br>
> persuasive response to website maintainers who feel threatened by<br>
> Tor. Giving them the option may inspire them to stop and think about<br>
> whether they really want to eliminate private access to their<br>
> system, and if not, what other options they might have. The time<br>
> they might otherwise have spent blocking Tor, they may instead spend<br>
> rethinking their overall approach to privacy and anonymity.<br>
><br>
> On 25/02/16 20:04, blacklight . wrote:<br>
>> hello there! i don't know if this mailing list works but i thought<br>
>> of giving it a try.<br>
>><br>
>> i was lately reading an article<br>
>> (<a href="http://www.pcworld.com/article/3037180/security/tor-users-increasingly-treated-like-second-class-web-citizens.html" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://www.pcworld.com/article/3037180/security/tor-users-increasingly-treated-like-second-class-web-citizens.html</a>)<br>
>> and it was about tor users getting blocked from accessing alot of<br>
>> website. but after giving this some thought i think i came up with<br>
>> a possible solution to the problem :there is a thing called<br>
>> bridges, they are used to access the tor network without your isp<br>
>> knowing that you use tor, but if you can use those proxies to<br>
>> enter the network, it might also be possible to exit the network<br>
>> with them. But then we face a second challenge, the exit nodes<br>
>> have to be configured in such a way that it will relay traffic to<br>
>> such a bridge, so the exit node owners also need to know the ip of<br>
>> the bridge. While this doesn't seem difficult to do, it can become<br>
>> difficult. You see if the bridges are published on a public<br>
>> list(like normal bridges are) then the blocking sites in question<br>
>> will be able to block those address too. While this also posses a<br>
>> problem, a possible solution could be found in something called<br>
>> flashproxies, flashproxies are bridges with a really short life<br>
>> span, they are created and destroyed fairly swiftly, when this is<br>
>> done in a rapid pace, they become really hard to block because the<br>
>> ip changes all the time. So if the exit nodes can be configured to<br>
>> make use of such flash proxies, then the problem could be solved.<br>
>> I Must admit that not an expert on this or anything, and it needs<br>
>> alot of more thought, but it could work. so i was wondering if<br>
>> there are any experts who could help me with thinking out this<br>
>> subject and maybe confirm if this idea could work.<br>
>><br>
>><br>
>> greetings, blacklight<br>
>><br>
>><br>
>> _______________________________________________<br>
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