Remote: origin http://git.torproject.org/ioerror/tor.git
Local:  isolated-streams /u/src/tor.ioerror/
Head:   b32947a tpyo correction

Changes:
	Modified doc/spec/proposals/171-separate-streams-by-port-or-host.txt
diff --git a/doc/spec/proposals/171-separate-streams-by-port-or-host.txt b/doc/spec/proposals/171-separate-streams-by-port-or-host.txt
index 3f745dc..3bd0532 100644
--- a/doc/spec/proposals/171-separate-streams-by-port-or-host.txt
+++ b/doc/spec/proposals/171-separate-streams-by-port-or-host.txt
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ we must balance network load issues and stream privacy. The Tor network will not
 currently scale to one circuit per connection nor should it anytime soon.
 
 Circuits are currently created with a few constraints and are rotated within
-a reasonable time window. This allows a rogue exit nodes to correlate all
+a reasonable time window. This allows a rogue exit node to correlate all
 streams on a given circuit.
 
 Design:
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ number.
 IsolateStreamsByHost will take a boolean value. When enabled, all connections,
 regardless of port number will be isolated with separate circuits per host. If
 this option is enabled, we should ensure that the client has a reasonable
-number of pre-built circuits to ensure percieved performance. This should also
+number of pre-built circuits to ensure perceived performance. This should also
 intentionally limit the total number of circuits a client will build to ten
 circuits to prevent abuse and load on the network. This is a tradeoff of
 performance for anonymity. Tor will issue a warning if a client encounters this
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ limit.
 Security implications:
 
 It is believed that the proposed changes will improve the anonymity for end
-user stream privacy.  The end user will no longer link all of their traffic at
+user stream privacy.  The end user will no longer link all of its traffic at
 a single exit node during a given time window.
 
 Specification: