[TWN team] Recent changes to the wiki pages

[Lunar]

===========================================================================
==== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2014/3 ====
===========================================================================

version 43
Author: phw
Date:   2014-01-21T13:39:01+00:00

   Slightly extend/correct the "spoiled onions" section.

--- version 42
+++ version 43
@@ -90,29 +90,30 @@
 Unfortunately, as Philipp Winter and Stefan Lindskog wrote in the
 introduction of their new research project [12], “there are exceptions:
 in the past, some exit relays were documented to have sniffed [13] and
-tampered with relayed traffic [14]. The project, dubbed “spoiled
-onions” is meant to “monitoring all exit relays for several months in
+tampered with relayed traffic [14]”. The project, dubbed “spoiled
+onions”, is meant to “monitoring all exit relays for several months in
 order to expose, document, and thwart malicious or misconfigured
 relays”.
 
 The paper [15] gives more details on the modular scanning software [16]
-that has been developed. It details on how it can detect tampering on
-the HTTP, HTTPS, SSH, and DNS protocols. The paper also highlights that
-in some occasions, it's the relay ISP that is responsible for the attack
-despite of the good faith of the operator.
-
-The authors also describe a modification to the Tor Browser that can
-help to detect man-in-the-middle attacks: if the browser is unable
-to verify a certificate, it will automatically retrieve the
-certificate again using a different Tor exit node. If the certificates
-do not match, a warning is then issued informing the user that an attack
-might be happening and offering to notify the Tor Project.
-
-Philipp and Stefan's efforts have already identified 25 bad relays that
-have subsequently been marked as such by directory authority operators.
-Even if we wish the number of problematic relays to stay low, let's hope
-this will help to identify those who try to abuse Tor users as soon as
-possible in the future.
+that has been developed. It elaborates on how it can detect tampering
+with the HTTP, HTTPS, SSH, and DNS protocols. The paper also discusses
+that occasionally it's the relay's ISP that is responsible for an attack
+despite the operator's good faith.
+
+The authors also describe an extension to Torbutton that can help with
+detecting HTTPS man-in-the-middle attacks: if the browser is unable
+to verify a certificate, it will automatically retrieve the certificate
+again using a different Tor exit node. If the certificates do not match,
+a warning can then be issued informing the user that an attack might be
+happening and offering to notify the Tor Project. However, the extension
+is merely a proof of concept and not usable at this point.
+
+Philipp and Stefan's efforts have already identified 25 malicious and
+misconfigured relays that have subsequently been marked as such by the
+directory authority operators. We want the number of problematic relays
+to remain low, so let's hope that this will help with identifying those
+who try to attack Tor users in the future.
 
  [12] http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/spoiled_onions/
  [13] http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~mikepo/papers/tordecoys.raid11.pdf



-- 
Your friendly TWN monitoring script

      In case of malfunction, please reach out for lunar at torproject.org
          or for the worst cases, tell weasel at torproject.org to kill me.