[TWN team] Recent changes to the wiki pages
Lunar
lunar at torproject.org
Wed Dec 31 00:20:05 UTC 2014
===========================================================================
=== https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TorWeeklyNews/2014/52 ===
===========================================================================
version 4
Author: harmony
Date: 2014-12-30T23:33:29+00:00
move items to next week
--- version 3
+++ version 4
@@ -128,7 +128,4 @@
[XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/news-team
}}}
-[http://events.ccc.de/congress/2014/wiki/Static:Main_Page 31c3] talks
- * [http://media.ccc.de/browse/congress/2014/31c3_-_6240_-_en_-_saal_g_-_201412271400_-_reproducible_builds_-_mike_perry_-_seth_schoen_-_hans_steiner.html Reproducible Builds: Moving Beyond Single Points of Failure for Software Distribution] ([http://events.ccc.de/congress/2014/Fahrplan/events/6240.html schedule]). Mike Perry, Seth Schoen.
- * [http://media.ccc.de/browse/congress/2014/31c3_-_6154_-_en_-_saal_1_-_201412272300_-_crypto_tales_from_the_trenches_-_nadia_heninger_-_julia_angwin_-_laura_poitras_-_jack_gillum.html Crypto Tales from the Trenches] ([http://events.ccc.de/congress/2014/Fahrplan/events/6154.html schedule]). Nadia Heninger, Julia Angwin, Laura Poitras and Jack Gillum. Mentions Tor and Tails.
- * more...
+[31c3 items moved to next week.]
version 3
Author: harmony
Date: 2014-12-30T23:26:53+00:00
write
--- version 2
+++ version 3
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
''78th issue of Tor Weekly News. Covering what's happening from December 23rd, 2014 to December 30th, 2014. To be released on December 31st, 2014.''
-'''Editor:'''
+'''Editor:''' Harmony
'''Subject:''' Tor Weekly News — December 31st, 2014
@@ -10,80 +10,113 @@
========================================================================
Welcome to the final issue in 2014 of Tor Weekly News, the weekly
-newsletter that covers what’s happening in the XXX Tor community.
+newsletter that covers what’s happening in the Tor community.
-Feature XXX
------------
+Attacks and rumors of attacks
+-----------------------------
-Feature 1 with cited source [XXX]
+Two weeks ago, the Tor Project relayed a warning [XXX] from an
+unspecified source to the effect that someone may have been preparing
+to seize, attack, or otherwise disable one or more of Tor’s directory
+authorities [XXX] in a bid to disrupt the entire Tor network. The lack
+of any specific information about the threat caused understandable
+concern in the Tor community, and several events that followed over
+the next fortnight did little to dispel this.
- [XXX]:
+First, the operator of a large Tor exit relay cluster reported [XXX]
+that his servers may have been physically interfered with by unknown
+parties a short while before his message. Later updates [XXX]
+suggested that foul play was less likely than initially thought.
-Monthly status reports for XXX month 2014
------------------------------------------
+Several days later, a large number of small exit relays were created all
+at once, in what appeared to be a “Sybil attack” [XXX]; this was
+detected [XXX] and halted almost immediately, as was a second, more
+recent incident [XXX]. As the Tor Project put it in a response [XXX],
+“we don’t expect any anonymity or performance effects based on what
+we've seen so far”, although a side-effect of the countermeasure is that
+relays hosted on some IP ranges are currently being rejected [XXX] by
+dirauths.
-The wave of regular monthly reports from Tor project members for the
-month of XXX has begun. XXX released his report first [XXX], followed
-by reports from name 2 [XXX], name 3 [XXX], and name 4 [XXX].
+As far as anyone can tell, these events are not related in any way to
+the initial warning. The Tor network has functioned normally throughout
+this period, and the appearance of a series of incidents is likely to be
+an accident of timing (helped by the online rumor mill) rather than the
+result of a coordinated campaign. It is never possible to say with
+certainty that attacks on the network will not occur, but the threat
+referred to in the original blog post has not yet materialized — and “no
+news is good news”.
- [XXX]:
- [XXX]:
- [XXX]:
- [XXX]:
+ [XXX]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/possible-upcoming-attempts-disable-tor-network
+ [XXX]: https://metrics.torproject.org/about.html#directory-authority
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-December/036067.html
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-December/036084.html
+ [XXX]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sybil_attack
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-consensus-health/2014-December/005381.html
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-consensus-health/2014-December/005414.html
+ [XXX]: http://www.twitlonger.com/show/n_1sjg365
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2014-December/006020.html
Miscellaneous news
------------------
-Item 1 with cited source [XXX].
+Lasse Øverlier discovered that ScrambleSuit’s [XXX] protection
+against “replay attacks”, in which an adversary repeats a client
+authentication event to learn that the server is in fact a ScrambleSuit
+bridge, doesn’t work. Philipp Winter explained [XXX] the issue, and
+suggested some simple fixes.
-Item 2 with cited source [XXX].
+ [XXX]: http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-December/008019.html
-Item 3 with cited source [XXX].
+Tom van der Woerdt asked for review [XXX] of a patch [XXX] to remove
+the obsolete version 1 of Tor’s link protocol from the current software:
+“It’s a rather large patch, though not as large as the patch that will
+remove v2 of the protocol. However, before I write that one, can someone
+please check whether my patch is sane and I’m not violating any
+standards or policies?”
- [XXX]:
- [XXX]:
- [XXX]:
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-December/008023.html
+ [XXX]: https://github.com/TvdW/tor/commit/75b5d94eb976ee4998189dc69582c62511dde9eb
-Tor help desk roundup
----------------------
+David Fifield trimmed [XXX] the length of meek’s [XXX] HTTP headers from
+413 to 162 bytes, reducing the bandwidth it uses by “approximately” 3%.
-Summary of some questions sent to the Tor help desk.
+ [XXX]: https://bugs.torproject.org/12778#comment:5
+ [XXX]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/meek
-News from Tor StackExchange
----------------------------
+Thanks to Kura [XXX] for running a mirror of the Tor Project website and
+software archive!
-Text with cited source [XXX].
-
- [XXX]:
-
-Easy development tasks to get involved with
--------------------------------------------
-
-Text with cited source [XXX].
-
- [XXX]:
-
-This week in Tor history
-------------------------
-
-Text with cited source [XXX].
-
- [XXX]:
+ [XXX]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-mirrors/2014-December/000815.html
Upcoming events
---------------
-Jul XX-XX | Event XXX brief description
- | Event City, Event Country
- | Event website URL
- |
-Jul XX-XX | Event XXX brief description
- | Event City, Event Country
- | Event website URL
+ Dec 31 13:30 UTC | little-t tor development meeting
+ | #tor-dev, irc.oftc.net
+ |
+ Dec 31 16:00 UTC | Pluggable transports meeting
+ | #tor-dev, irc.oftc.net
+ |
+ Dec 05 18:00 UTC | Tor Browser online meeting
+ | #tor-dev, irc.oftc.net
+ |
+ Dec 05 18:00 UTC | OONI development meeting
+ | #ooni, irc.oftc.net
+ |
+ Dec 06 18:00 UTC | little-t tor patch workshop
+ | #tor-dev, irc.oftc.net
+ |
+ Jan 03 20:00 UTC | Tails contributors meeting
+ | #tails-dev, irc.oftc.net
+ | https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2014-December/007626.html
+ |
+ Jan 07 09:00 GMT | Roger @ Real World Cryptography Workshop 2015
+ | London, England
+ | http://www.realworldcrypto.com/rwc2015
-This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by XXX, XXX, and
-XXX.
+This issue of Tor Weekly News has been assembled by Harmony.
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